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As an authority on Chinese culture, David Gedalecia, The Michael O. Fisher Professor of History at The College of Wooster, is a valuable resource for those interested in China. Specific areas of expertise include Chinese history and philosophy in the early modern period (Sung through Ming), Neo-Confucian interpretations of the Chinese classics, and Confucian scholarship during the Yþan dynasty. A graduate of Queens College (City University of New York), Gedalecia received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University in Chinese history. He is the author of The Philosophy of Wu Ch'eng (Indiana) and Solitary Crane in a Spring Grove (Wiesbaden) and has also written essays on Chinese intellectual history during the Mongol period for the journals Philosophy East and West and Journal of the American Oriental Society. Gedalecia was a National Defense Foreign Language Fellow in Chinese at Columbia University and at Harvard University. He was also the recipient of an American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) fellowship for an International Philosophers' Conference at the University of Hawaii. Gedalecia is a member of the ACLS Sub-Committee on the Mid-Imperial Period of Chinese Civilization and a participating member of the Columbia University Seminar on Neo-Confucianism. He has also presented papers at Columbia, Harvard, and Princeton Universities. |
The relationship between the United States
and China has been described as complicated, confusing, and often contentious.
David Gedalecia, professor of history at The College of Wooster, is an expert
on China, and he offers some insight about the differences between the two
super powers and the prospects for future diplomacy.
Why does communication between China and the United States seem to be so strained? There are a number of issues that put us at odds with China, including alleged Chinese espionage, Chinese involvement in campaign financing, the U.S. rocketing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the detention of the American reconnaissance plane and its crew, and the incarceration of Americans of Chinese descent. These tend to overshadow more fundamental differences over missile defense systems, the modernization of China's military, and, of course, the overall American protection of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Most recently, tensions have arisen in Central Asia, where the United States is challenged by a six-nation consortium that includes Russia and China, the issues revolving around oil interests and the spread of militant Islam. In a larger sense, the postwar dominance of the United States in East Asia and the Pacific is being challenged by China's emergence as a nation and its natural desire to be the leader in the region. So, in some sense, China has replaced the Soviet Union as a rival of the United States on the international stage. What are the major diplomatic issues on which the two countries differ most? The most long-standing issue concerns the Republic of China on Taiwan. China has not fully tested the American commitment to ensure Taiwan's security. Other issues of sovereignty concern Tibet, where many Americans support the Dalai Lama, and islands in the South China Seas. Another issue has to do with arms sales. The United States opposes Chinese sales to Pakistan and Iran. For their part, the Chinese oppose American arms sales to protect Taiwan. Ultimately, arms sales reveal larger questions about strategic alliances. The real "hot button" issue is human rights, which is sometimes tied to bilateral trade. Americans are sympathetic with Chinese dissidents and religious movements, while China considers this to be meddling in its internal affairs. Keeping markets open may ease political repression in the long run, but the persecutions naturally trouble Americans. What is likely to happen next in the conflict between China and Taiwan? The stalemate will continue as long as Taiwan does not become an independent nation. China may stage military exercises in the Taiwan Straits, but it is doubtful that it will either invade Taiwan or institute some sort of blockade. Of course, history is often determined by accidents (to wit, the explosion of the U.S. battleship Maine and the Spanish-American War). But it is in no one's interest to start a war with Taiwan that will end U.S.-China relations and turn China into a pariah nation, to say nothing of ending the lucrative unofficial trade between Taiwan and China. The United States has a role to play in having cool heads prevail so that political and economic evolution in China will make unification attractive to Taiwan, whose democracy challenges the Chinese system. In general, how do the Chinese people view Americans? This is a complex question. There is an anti-Western attitude among Chinese based on Western dominance in the 19th and 20th centuries, though most of the recent anti-American outbursts are initiated by the government. But such demonstrations attract people because they indirectly criticize the business-minded political elite, both civil and military, that benefits more than the average Wang or Li from the economic relationship with the United States. If we look at the larger picture, the Chinese know that Americans are the leaders in today's world and like to go with the winner. The United States represents a model of economic opportunity, and unprecedented numbers of Chinese are migrating to this country. And there is much in the way of positive historical experience to suggest that "down-to-earth" qualities in both cultures serve to mitigate some of the obvious historical hostilities. What is the prognosis for relations between China and the United States? The hope on the part of American political and business leaders is that commercial, cultural, and diplomatic contacts will help to modernize China's political and economic system so that it will evolve in the way Taiwan's did. The Chinese system is still Leninist in structure, as was Taiwan's, but by the 1980s, as an American-trained political and entrepreneurial class came to the fore, Taiwan evolved into a democracy. If this is a possible model for China, then the United States has to pursue a peaceful and interactive relationship, which also means getting China involved in the global order. But China's evolution will also result in a desire to become a "player" on the world stage, even militarily. So, we must be vigilant in protecting our friends and non-communist allies in East Asia and try to preserve a cooperative Sino-American relationship in the interests of international harmony. |
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| Last updated: January 10, 2006 · For more information, contact John Finn | ||
